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I. The Obvious Disgrace
The Supreme Court's aberrational decision of Bush v. Gore'
has been devastatingly criticized.2 One legal scholar has ar-
gued that the majority Justices "are criminals in every true
sense of the word, and... belong behind prison bars as much as
any American white-collar criminal who ever lived."3 Many of
these criticisms are quite extreme and perhaps have less basis
in the Constitution, precedent, or statute than those of the au-
1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE 10 (Oxford Univ. Press
2001).
3. VINCENT BUGLIOSI, THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICA: How THE SUPREME COURT
UNDERMINED THE CONSTITUTION AND CHOSE THE PRESIDENT 49 (Thunder's Mouth/
Nation Book 2000); See Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through The Lens of
Constitutional History, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1721 (2001); David A. Strauss, Bush v.
Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 737 (2001), for examples of
articles with strong and legitimate criticism. In addition, Volume 29, Issue 2 of the
Florida State University Law Review is entirely devoted to the Bush v. Gore case.
Notable among the articles is James A. Gardner, The Regulatory Role of State Con-
stitutional Structural Constraints In Presidential Elections, 29 FLA. ST. UNIV. L.
REV. 625, 635-37 (2001) (specifically mentioning the relevance of a "Republican
Form of Government" and Federalist Number 10). There is also a continuing
amassing of evidence of misdeeds. See various articles available at http://
www.Democrats.com. We realize that a book could be written expanding, substan-
tiating, and integrating this evidence and that we are preaching to the choir as-
sembled by many others who have gone before us. We rely on that evidence, the
dialectical openness of the choir, to consider the importance of the constitutional
considerations not sufficiently stressed and the racial repercussions which implica-
tions are so antithetical to democracy, and the years of civil rights achievements
secured at tremendous cost through heroic efforts of many sung and unsung, killed
and surviving. Finally, we point out that, as time passes, we expect more revela-
tions of malfeasance to support the analysis of this article. This process seems to
have begun, since the Justice Department was in the process of examining and
possibly filing lawsuits against Florida counties for violations of the Voting Rights
Act as this article went to print. See Steve Bousquet, Voting Rights Lawsuits
Might Only Prolong Furor, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 25, 2002, at lB.
270
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol22/iss2/1
20021 MAD AS HELL 271
thors of this piece. Such extreme positions do not show what
should have been done at the propitious time. It has become
such a truism that the Court should not have reached out (once
by Justice Scalia alone and then by the confused, confusing ma-
jority) that some law professors now casually state the "Su-
preme Court shouldn't have taken the case."4 Clear, crucial and
long-established constitutional elements demonstrate that an
appropriate remedy did exist for the anti-democratic overreach-
ing to steal the election. 5
We will not burden the reader with theories so common nor
documentation so obvious, but will accept the irrefutable fact of
a pattern and practice of limiting access to the polls for the mi-
norities and poor,6 the use of incomprehensible ballots, 7 of clear
4. Katherine Rosman, Smoke-Filled Rooms L'il Liberals, THE NEW YORKER,
July 2, 2001, at 25 (quoting Larry Kramer, NYU Professor and former clerk to
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.). Marx once said that he found Hegel standing on
his head and put him on his feet. The Court in Bush v. Gore found equal protection
on the right footing to protect the right to vote and black's rights in general, and
the Court turned it on its head to destroy both. Not only did the Court do that but
under a cloud of rhetoric, still continuing in some quarters, quasi-scholarly and
elsewhere, about "finality" and conjectures of what might have resulted had the
Florida process continued, they intervened in the process rather than assessing its
result properly framed in a lawsuit for legal interpretation. Supreme Court Jus-
tices rarely discuss their decisions in public. However, in January, when a group of
visiting Russian justices asked seven members of the Supreme Court about Bush
v. Gore, remarkable things were said. Dissenter Steven Breyer said it was "the
most outrageous, indefensible thing" the Court had ever done. Dissenter Ruth
Bader Ginsburg said, "here we're applying the Equal Protection Clause in a way
that would de-legitimize virtually every election in American history." David
Kaplan, National Affairs, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 17, 2001, at 28.
5. Once again, there has been more than ample documentation that across the
State of Florida completely illegal acts took place. See http://www.Democrats.com
for a continuing compendium of many such acts ongoing as we write (e.g. the mili-
tary ballots). John Conyers Jr., the ranking Democrat on the House Judiciary
Committee recently wrote:
A sad reality is that almost four decades since the passage of the Voting
Rights Act, the disenfranchised are overwhelmingly people of color. In Flor-
ida in 2000, African-American voters were nearly 10 times as likely as
whites to have their ballots discarded. Voters in low-income, high-minority
districts were more than three times as likely to have their votes for presi-
dent discarded as voters in high-income, low-minority districts.
The lesson in Florida was that notwithstanding the great work of many
states and localities, one rogue state can disrupt a federal election and dis-
enfranchise thousands.
John Conyers Jr., Voting Rights in Peril, N.Y. TIMES, January 30, 2002, at A27.
6. The purpose of§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994)
is to eliminate this practice; "[T]he proscription of § 2 extends beyond formal barri-
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miscounting by biased officials,8 and of intimidation practiced
against those who were attempting an accurate recount.9 Fo-
cusing on the most egregious part of this decision - the racism,
explicit and implicit - we will refer to some widely accepted and
well-proven facts in this connection for the purposes of illustra-
tion and clarity. Even if the pattern and practice of discrimina-
tion were not enough, the fact that racism was a central device
for preventing an accurate vote in Florida will justify our theory
beyond doubt.
II. Article I and the Sanctity of the Ballot Box
Article I is the heart of our constitutional guarantee of de-
mocracy. The Supreme Court, in interpreting this Article on its
way to its decision establishing the principle "one man, one
vote," held that the sanctity and integrity of voting procedures
were hallowed principles of our democracy. 10 There must be no
infringement of unhampered access to the polling place." Bal-
lots must be appropriately supplied and used; and they must be
counted properly.12 These decisions were long delayed by the
ers to access ... [to] all practices which ... result in the denial of equal access to
any phase of the electoral process for minority group members." Harris v. Siegel-
man, 695 F. Supp. 517, 527 (M.D. Ala. 1988); see, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30 (1986) (districting schemes that delete minority voting strength).
7. See Rebecca Goldsmith, "We're Not Fools,' Says Critic of Redesigned Ballot -
The Intention was Innocent - Larger Letters for Aging Eyes - But Gore Fans are
Foaming, STAR-LEDGER, Nov. 10, 2000, at 23. The confusing effect "butterfly bal-
lots" had on the entire country is akin to the situation in David v. Heckler, 591 F.
Supp. 1033, 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that notice provided to welfare recipi-
ents denied them of Due Process, since the notice provided was incomprehensible
to most people who received it, and used confusing "bureaucratic gobbledegook,
jargon, double talk.., and doublespeak.").
8. See Beth Kassab, Poll Worker Loses His Job After National Ballot Blunder;
The Elections Supervisor Retired Some Longtime Clerks After a Ballot Bag was
Overlooked Last Year, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 7, 2001, at K1.
9. The authors posit that protestors were used in Dade County, Florida to in-
timidate those recounting there. See Louis Freedberg, As Congress Reconvenes,
GOP Wants to Keep Grip on Power, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 9, 2000, at A7.
10. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17
(1964) ("Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined.").
11. See United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386 (1915) ("[T]he right to have
one's vote counted is as open to protection by Congress as the right to put a ballot
in a box.").
12. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566 (1969) (The right to
vote includes "all action necessary to make a vote effective.").
272
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invocation of the idea of a "political question,"13 an apparent
bow to the separation of powers upon which our argument is
also based.
In a major step towards reaffirming the principle of "one
man, one vote" announced in Baker v. Carr,14 Justice Hugo
Black argued in Wesberry v. Sanders'5 that the value of a vote
could be based on unchallenged precedents alone (obviating the
need for some of the tortured arguments put forth in the Bush
v. Gore case).1 6 Justice Black implicitly acknowledged the exis-
tence of racial overtones in articulating a rule that applies to
the circumstances in Bush v. Gore: "No right is more precious in
a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those
who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.
Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to
vote is undermined." 7 Our Constitution leaves no room for the
classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this
right.18 All but one of the controlling cases, which we will ana-
lyze extensively later, deal with the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Justice Black, however, based his conclusion on
a reading of Article I, Section 2, which so interpreted by the
Supreme Court, is sufficient to discredit Bush v. Gore com-
pletely. 19 Wesberry established that there are constitutional
limitations placed upon official action or inaction affecting the
weight of votes; one person's effective vote in our democracy
13. The political question doctrine precludes cases, as non-justiciable, where
there is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a co-
ordinate political department..." Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
14. See id.
15. 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964).
16. This analysis is summarized in Jonathan Weiss, An Analysis of Wesberry
v. Sanders, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 67 (1965), which discusses the following cases: Ex
parte Yarborough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) (based on protection of voters from intimi-
dation even before the civil rights movement and Voting Act); United States v.
Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386 (1915) (where Justice Holmes stated: "the right to have
one's vote counted is as open to protection by Congress as the right to put a ballot
in a box"); and particularly, United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (in lock-
step with the decision in United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944), invalidating
dilution of the ballot box, while upholding the conviction of those who falsified elec-
tion tallies).
17. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 17.
18. Cf. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1963) (stating "[tihe concept of
'we the people' under the Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters but
equality among those who meet the basic qualifications.").
19. See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 17-18.
2002] 273
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shall have equal weight with his neighbors. 20 As demonstrated
below, impediments, distortions, differentiations having racial
impact and thwarting of the recount in the Florida vote, vio-
lated this established principle of law, and rendered the deci-
sion awarding Bush the election (so he would not have
"irreparable damage") completely inconsistent with Wesberry
and its progeny.
III. Separation of Powers
Did the Supreme Court have the right to intervene in the
election? The doctrine of separation of powers suggests not.21
The time may have come to completely re-examine this area
with deep historic roots.22 There is a long series of essays on the
importance of the separation of powers doctrine that deserve
careful consideration concerning The Federalist Papers, particu-
larly Federalist No. 85 and its immediate predecessors and suc-
cessors. 23 Rather than undertake an extensive analysis of this
area, however, we choose to rely upon the Supreme Court's cur-
rent view of the separation of powers. The Supreme Court is
one of the three separate branches of federal government which,
by judicial decision, has reserved to itself the function of inter-
preting the Constitution, while leaving explicit and implicit
powers to the other branches and even to the States.24 The cur-
20. See id.
21. Commenting on the inherent difficulty of establishing the lines between
the branches of government, Madison writes in Federalist No. 47, "that where the
whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the
whole of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are
subverted." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 140 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairchild ed.,
John Hopkins Univ. Press 2d ed. 1981); see also, Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc.
514 U.S. 211 (1995), for an interesting discussion by Justice Scalia on the develop-
ment of the concept of separation of powers.
22. See JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (Burt Franklin 1888) (demonstrat-
ing how the separation of powers doctrine formed a basis of argument throughout
the drafting of the U.S. Constitution).
23. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The
Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301
(1998); David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 539 (2001).
24. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). "No doubt the political
branches have a role in interpreting and applying the Constitution, but ever since
Marbury this Court has remained the ultimate expositor of the Constitutional
text." Id. at 617 n.7.
[Vol. 22:269274
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rent Court has adopted an increasingly strict interpretation of
the separation doctrine. For example, the Court recently struck
down the Violence Against Women Act 25 holding that Congress
had exceeded its limited separate powers. 26 Similarly, in Legal
Services Corp. v. Velasquez,27 the Court struck down a legisla-
tive provision which would have prohibited the advancement of
constitutional arguments in welfare disputes reaching the
Court, not only on viewpoint restriction but also on the separa-
tion of powers. 28 In considering the question of executive power,
the Supreme Court formulated its Chevron29 doctrine, giving
considerable deference to legislative and administrative "exper-
tise." Many state courts accept this separation doctrine without
hesitation.30
Yet, with no authority, and with a history of restraint in
this area, the Supreme Court acted dramatically and in viola-
tion of the sanctity of Articles II and III of the Constitution by
prematurely, at best, exceeding its traditional power to review
the result of an election, and by failing to consider whether it
violated constitutional principles in overreaching to prevent re-
counts and investigations. 31 Article II explicitly states that the
conduct of the states' legislature determines the mechanism for
selecting presidential electors. 32 Depending on the state, of
25. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
26. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610.
27. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
28. Id. at 548-49. We noted earlier the Court's reluctance to address the de-
struction of the ballot box's integrity as "political" presumably on separation
grounds. See supra, notes 10-13, and accompanying text.
29. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1986).
30. See Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Urbach, 750 N.E.2d 52, 59 (2001)
(where the Court refused to "rewrite the statute" - implying it would not interfere
in processes which were the province of another branch).
31. The Court has long emphasized the sanctity of Article III in relation to the
separation of powers doctrine. The Court has labeled Article III as "an inseparable
element of the constitutional system of checks and balances . . . " See Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982). Article III
also prevents the encroachment of one branch upon the powers of another. See
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976).
32. "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Repre-
sentatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United
States, shall be appointed an Elector." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
2752002]
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course, state courts may involve themselves in election deci-
sions only until such a point that their involvement becomes fi-
nal and clearly unconstitutional in result.3 3  Assuming,
arguendo, that the Supreme Court could constitutionally have
any involvement at all, it is nevertheless clearly forbidden to act
as it did without first having before it for examination a final
state court decision, even in the face of the most blatant or egre-
gious violations 34 (e.g., all the electors refusing to vote for an
African-American). For a Supreme Court, which has been mov-
ing steadily in the direction of "States' Rights,"'35 to interfere in
a state process involving the appropriate state court, is a forti-
ori absurd on its face.
IV. Interpreting the Relevant Constitution
Another solid theoretical ground exists for rejecting such
unwarranted intrusion into state power dating back to the ear-
liest Supreme Court decisions. In Marbury v. Madison,36 Jus-
tice Marshall established the now enshrined principle that the
Supreme Court was the final arbiter of the meaning of the Con-
stitution.37 Probably the easiest and most effective way to view
the Constitution is to establish unchanging cognitive concepts
that can be applied to resolve disputes arising from constantly
changing factual situations. Thus, Laird v. Tatum38 treats the
Air Force as part of the constitutional term "armies,"39 and Bur-
styn v. Wilson40 holds that motion pictures are covered under
freedom of the press. 41
33. State involvement may be unconstitutional if it violates Equal Protection,
the principle of "one man, one vote," and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth Amendments implemented by 28 U.S.C. § 1348 and 18 U.S.C. § 1981, par-
ticularly augmented by the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
34. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2001); see also North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973).
35. See Lynn A. Baker, The Revival of States' Rights: A Progress Report and a
Proposal, 22 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 95 (1998).
36. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
37. Id. at 177-78.
38. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
39. Id. At 16-17 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
40. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
41. Id. at 502. This approach clearly renders absurd the notion that somehow
nine Justices could intuit the "intention" of individuals who were collectively try-
ing to craft a model rather than to express their collective inclinations or wills. If
the latter had been the case, Beard's book would be more devastating and the Con-
276 [Vol. 22:269
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The rationale of Marshall's argument is that Justices are
best equipped to read legal language. 42 With that conclusion, he
arrogated the final interpretation of the Constitution to his
Court. The Marbury decision does not, of course, either implic-
itly or explicitly, convey any other powers to the Court.43 Much
later, however, in another racially charged case, Brown v.
Board of Education,44 the Court did attempt an equitable rem-
edy imported from some vague doctrine of implied resources
and common law.45 By ordering all "deliberate speed" in Brown
however, the Court prompted too much fake deliberation and
little if any speed.46
There are many ways to interpret the language found in
the Constitution. There is the textual analysis with historical
underpinnings of the Fourteenth Amendment, as urged in dis-
sent by Justice Hugo Black in Adamson v. California.47 There
is a form of textual analysis that relies on reading the words as
forming a philosophical whole with embodiments in the rele-
vant cases. 48
The prevailing approach, however, is to use the common
law method of filling out the content by case discussions and the
use of precedents. This approach has had the unfortunate re-
sult of importing into the Constitution such alien concepts as
"sovereign immunity," "community standards," and "offending
basic notions of liberty," all of which the Constitution was con-
structed to avoid, and thereby watering down the conceptual
absolutes that Black so persuasively advocated. 49 These specifi-
cally formulated rights and powers were written against the
stitution, with its many flaws, requiring the subsequent addition of a Bill of Rights
and other amendments, would be rendered far less important, coherent, basic, and
able to serve as a model for other societies seeking democracy. See CHARLES A.
BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES (1952).
42. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173-75.
43. See id.
44. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
45. Id. at 301.
46. See Joseph Goldstein's devastating criticism of this position in JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION 57-80 (1992).
47. 332 U.S. 46, 69-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
48. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Weiss, Privilege, Posture And Protection "Religion"
in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593 (1964); Jonathan A. Weiss, The Elements of the Law,
10 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 408 (1985).
49. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 68-123 (Black, J., dissenting).
20021 277
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governing principles of all the common law taught and imbued
colleagues (thereby creating fantasies such as "balancing tests"
with no guidance as how to implement them - what weight
given what against what for what reason?). However the Con-
stitution is read, no precedent exists for moving from "interpret-
ing" as justified by Marshall to subverting its explicit language.
Ironically, the Court rejected any "hearing" of the legality of the
rather dubiously justified "Vietnam Era" as apparently beyond
its scope of interpretative powers under the separation
doctrine.50
Justice Black's view of individual rights established by the
Constitution has prevailed to some extent. For example, the
Court has struck down many state provisions involving various
Amendments, including the First Amendment, 51 which explic-
itly applies to Congress, and for many years was used to invali-
date state laws. But it was not until 1965, in the case of
Lamont v. Postmaster General,52 that the Supreme Court ap-
plied the First Amendment to another branch of government.
Any of these methods of interpretation are superior to a leap of
fantasy projecting a collective "intent" upon a collective formu-
lation of conceptual categories - with no basis to support the as-
sertion that their "intent" is superior to that of anyone else.
Many constitutional rights are applicable to state activities as
Justice Black urged in Adamson;5 3 his view of the Bill of Rights
50. See Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 945 (1967). Ironically, a main thrust of the claim of illegality was the separa-
tion of powers between Congress and the President, an area that arguably was one
improperly referred to the Supreme Court as lying beyond its usual interpretative
powers concerning legal disputes; see also, Note, Congress, the President, and the
Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1771 (1968) (discussing the
"proper constitutional allocation between the President and Congress of the power
to control the use of force in foreign affairs."). See generally, 110 CONG. REC. S.
18,443 (Aug. 7, 1964) (statement of Sen. Morse). We are grateful to Gary Stone for
this point and these citations.
51. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940) (holding that a
Connecticut statute violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the extent
it authorized censorship of religion).
52. 381 U.S. 301, 304 (1965) (holding that Postal Service and Federal Employ-
ees Salary Act of 1962, requiring detention and delivery upon request of "commu-
nist political propaganda," unconstitutional as violative of the First Amendment.).
53. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
[Vol. 22:269
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as a set of broad commands has been applied to some of them.54
After the Bill of Rights were enacted, the most important
Amendments for this case, further justification was provided for
rejecting the Supreme Court's Bush v. Gore decision beyond its
clear violation of constitutional language and precedent as es-
tablished above.
The explicit underlying purposes of the Thirteenth, Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments as well as the associated
Civil Rights Acts 55 were to rectify the barbaric practice of slav-
ery, disenfranchisement, and humiliation.56 These purposes
have been applied to the states. There was the Voting Rights
Act 57 that was won by so much struggle, blood, sacrifice, and
courage. 58 Yet, all these are cognizable by the Supreme Court
in the range of applying interpretation to the results achieved
by statutory or patterned or customary action, not to interfere
in a state's contemplation and process of voting, particularly
under Article II - nor to reach into state courts' deliberations
before courts there reach final decisions in order to accept a case
by certiorari.59 Worst of all, the cutting edge of the Florida vio-
54. See Jonathan A. Weiss, Review: One Man's Stand For Freedom, Mr. Jus-
tice Black and the Bill of Rights, 72 YALE L.J. 1665, 1669 (1963).
55. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)); Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
56. Jennifer R. Hagan, Symposium, Statutory Rape Realities: Scholarship and
Practice - Can We Lose the Battle and Still Win the War?: The Fight Against Do-
mestic Violence After The Death of Title III of the Violence Against Women Act, 50
DEPAUL L. REV. 919 (2001); Eric K. Yamamoto et. al., Symposium, Civil Rights in
the New Decade - Dismantling Civil Rights: Multiracial Resistance and Recon-
struction, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 523 (2001); Petal Nevella Modeste, Race Hate Speech:
The Pervasive Badge of Slavery That Mocks The Thirteenth Amendment, 44 How.
L.J. 311 (2001).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965).
58. See Gary Fields & Jennifer Davit, Lost in a Shuffle: In Selma, a
Landmark of Civil Rights, Voting Can Still Be a Struggle, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18,
2000, at Al.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1994) states:
State courts; certiorari (a) Final judgments or decrees rendered by the
highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed
by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or
statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a
statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being repug-
nant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any
title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the
Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or author-
2002] 279
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lations was the return of racism in order to prevent access (in-
cluding inexcusable exclusion of and voting access impediments
placed in front of blacks), accurate ballots and directions, and
proper counts. 60 This racism violated not only the sanctity of
the ballot box but three constitutional amendments61 as well as
legislation with enforcement devices to help eradicate Jim
Crow 62 - particularly in the crucial area of voting rights. This
point is partly recognized in the Ginsburg, Souter, Stevens,
Breyer dissent.63 These enforcement devices furnish the rem-
edy for use by the executive branch and the President as Com-
mander in Chief.
V. Presidential Duties and Troops
In History of the American People,64 Woodrow Wilson, like
Justice Black,65 pointed out that the laws of the new govern-
ment were to be imperative not advisory.6 6 Article II provided
ity exercised under, the United States. (b) For the purposes of this section,
the term "highest court of a State" includes the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals. Id.
Interference or injunction based on conjecture, let alone on "irreparable damage"
for one candidate (even overlooking the facts that votes were still being counted
elsewhere and ballots yet to come even in Florida, that there were months before
the inauguration, much time before the electors met, and a constitutional provi-
sion for governance without'an active elected President) when a review, if possible
or necessary on the appropriate principles could occur, strains belief that even the
Justice believed he was doing anything but getting away with the naked use of
power for partisan political purposes.
60. "Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not,
by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of
another. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000). The State has not shown that
its procedures include the necessary safeguards. Id. at 109.
61. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV & XV.
62. For a historical analysis, see Kenneth W. Mack, Law, Society, Identity,
and the Making of the Jim Crow South: Travel and Segregation on Tennessee Rail-
roads, 1875-1905, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 377 (1999).
63. Bush, 531 U.S. at 141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
64. WOODROW WILSON, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 71 (1902).
65. Another way besides conceiving of the Constitution as cognitive com-
mands as did Black, the similarity to Black is that Wilson believed that the Execu-
tive had the administrative force as Black and others did in the early Commerce
Clause cases.
66. "Its laws were to be, not advisory, but imperative... It was provided with
the executive the Confederation had lacked: a president in whose authority should
be concentrated the whole administrative force of its government." Wilson, supra
note 64, at 71.
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for an Executive, a person "in whose authority should be con-
centrated the whole administrative force of its government."67
Conservative Republican President Dwight Eisenhower (in the
era when conservative was not a euphemism for "reactionary")
sent troops to Little Rock, Arkansas. 68 President Kennedy de-
livered troops in Mississippi to enforce school desegregation. 69
Certainly, the sacred nature of the vote required the same ac-
tion, particularly after the achievements of the enfranchising
amendments, Civil Rights Acts, Voting Rights Acts, and imple-
mentation of associated powers. 70 Other remedies were sug-
gested in the dissents by Souter, Stevens, Ginsberg and
Breyer.71
The legislature never had a chance to consider the invalid-
ity of the Florida vote. But the country knew it was invalid.
And so did the President. Just as troops were sent for other
civil rights violations and to protect those trying to exercise or
further their rights, troops should have been deployed to Flor-
ida by President Clinton in this instance to protect the integrity
67. Id. (emphasis added). As we pointed out earlier, cases based on separa-
tion of powers, Article II, or states' rights should only reach the Supreme Court
after a final state court decision. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. On
the other hand, the President can intervene to protect the democratic process at
any time.
68. Troops were sent to assist court-ordered integration of a high school. See
George S. Peek, Recent Legislation: Where Are We Going With Federal Hate Crimes
Legislation? Congress and the Politics of Sexual Orientation, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 537,
555 (2001). History and precedent demonstrate the plausibility of our argument.
In 1875 President Grant refused to send federal troops to Mississippi to monitor a
federal election. See Paul D. Carrington, Lawyers Amid The Redemption of the
South, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIv. L. REV. 41 (1999). Two years later because of the
Hayes-Tilden Compromise of 1876, see Yamamoto, supra note 56 and accompany-
ing text, all federal troops were withdrawn from the south (until Little Rock) and
Jim Crow was the result. An intelligent historically educated President, such as
Bill Clinton, should have known that Grant was wrong and Eisenhower was right.
Troops should have been sent to prevent the disruption of any recount by protes-
tors; to monitor a state-wide recount, and to monitor a state-wide revote, if neces-
sary. Further, if there was still a resulting failure to correct the destruction of the
real vote, the Florida electoral votes should not have counted.
69. See id. President Kennedy requisitioned the Mississippi National Guard
to aid desegregation. Id.
70. One would think that President Clinton, who suffered one branch of the
government acting out of control in "impeachment" proceedings, would have been
alert to curbing the abuses of another where it affected the fundamental right of
democracy.
71. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123-58 (2000).
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of the election.72 Since the racism was so pervasive, so obvious,
and such a major reversal of progress, it will be the central pre-
mise underlying this article, in conjunction with an Article III
analysis in light of the separation of powers doctrine.
Even before the election, the Civil Rights Division of the
Clinton Administration should have realized that a disen-
franchisement mechanism had been developed and deployed
well ahead of the 2000 election. Devices, such as denying votes
to those with felony convictions in Southern states,73 and Flor-
ida in particular, along with other covert and obvious imple-
ments, such as outdated, confusing, and difficult to use voting
equipment and ballots, had been, and were being, used as an
illegal and unconstitutional method of disenfranchising a dis-
proportionate segment of the black and poor communities.74 So-
called black leaders and Democratic strategists were sadly re-
miss in not focusing more aggressively on this conduct; the Clin-
ton administration was blind-sided by the effectiveness of the
implementation of the disenfranchising mechanisms.75 Of
course, the result was the theft of the Florida vote and the nam-
ing of George W. Bush as President by a five to four vote of the
United States Supreme Court.76 It can also be assumed, given
that George W. Bush is the beneficiary of this system and given
the direction of this and likely future Supreme Courts in the
near future, there is little that can be expected to come from
72. This country has urged and implemented military support in other coun-
tries with corrupted elections to preserve the right to vote. For example, in 1994,
the U.S. invaded Haiti to oust a military dictatorship and restore the nation's dem-
ocratically elected leader, Jean Bertrand Aristide. Michael Norton, No Solutions in
Haiti: Six Years of Work Does Little Good, available at http://abcnews.go.com/sec-
tions/world/ DailyNews/haitiOO0318.html (Mar. 18, 2000). Compare this situation
with a detailed analysis of the International Law Principles violated by the actions
in pari delictu of Florida and the Supreme Court. See Erin Chlopak, Unequal Pro-
tection: Disenfranchisement in the 2000 United States Presidential Election, 8
HUM. RTS. BRIEF 34, 36 (2001).
73. This is a common form of disenfranchisement, and one to which this arti-
cle devotes much attention.
74. See John Lantigua, How the GOP Gamed the System in Florida, THE NA-
TION, Apr. 30, 2001, at 14.
75. Hiring "corporate" lawyers who litigated it piecemeal instead of "civil
rights lawyers" was also an error. So was the concession that there would be no
contesting of the "military ballots."
76. See Bush, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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either the present Supreme Court or from the present
administration.
The issues must be joined, and very serious debate must be
initiated to deal with the full participation in the right of citi-
zenship as has been done in past civil rights struggles. This is
war and we must fight it.
VI. Some History
The cornerstone of Jim Crow in the United States has al-
ways been, and still is, the denial of the right of blacks to vote.77
Simply put, if you can vote, the establishment dare not discrimi-
nate against you. We seriously delude ourselves if we believe
that old Jim is dead. The last presidential election demon-
strated all too well that the institution is alive and kicking. No
matter what other hideous forms Jim Crow may have taken, no
matter the manner and configuration in which it was mani-
fested, its foundation was rooted solidly in the premise that the
black man, under all circumstances, must be prevented from
voting effectively. The point is entirely missed if this is not rec-
ognized. Just as the matrix of slavery was the maintenance of
the ignorance of the black citizen, the linchpin of subjugation,
following the destruction of that institution was, and is, the de-
nial of the franchise. The slave had to be prevented from learn-
ing how to read at all costs, including severe punishment for
anyone who dared teach him,78 lest he absorb dangerous ideas
about equality and freedom and the ability to communicate
them. Thus, it was easily understood after the Civil War by
those who would continue slavery's badge and its yoke, once the
veil of ignorance, maintained so readily during bondage, could
no longer be so easily and totally kept over the eyes of the now
freedman, that the most direct route to total control and domi-
nation of the former slave was through disenfranchisement.
The Ku Klux Klan and other such organizations knew well
that other efforts of subjugation would work, but only piece-
meal. Inferior schools, low wages, intimidation, and segrega-
tion were all tools effectively used, brick by brick, to build a wall
77. See Mack, supra note 62.
78. See KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE
ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 208-11 (1956).
28320021
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to surround and contain blacks in this country. On the other
hand, denial of the right to vote was, and is, the single most
forceful way in which to accomplish that end in one fell swoop.
If people cannot vote in our society, they are unable to influence
other factors which control their lives. Quite simply put, the
right to vote gives a people the ability to influence the govern-
mental entities that manage the political subdivisions, be they
cities, counties, states, or nations in which they live. This
power carries with it a direct ability to affect every facet of one's
life. Take away the effective right to vote and the few who con-
trol power can maintain that control, without effective chal-
lenge. Without a universal franchise, voting is controlled by the
wealthy and politically strong and becomes simply the mecha-
nism used to keep the "rich, rich, the powerful, powerful, and
the poor, poor." 79
We have focused this part of our discussion on the history
of the disenfranchisement of blacks because they have borne the
brunt of the attack, through methods, at first overt, and now
less open but still effective. The reach of this process, while still
falling heaviest on blacks, has been refined to cover others as
well in its insidious web; the better to control the outcome.80
The most frightening thing is not that open racist and class dis-
enfranchisement still exist, all the way from the smallest pre-
cincts to the highest Court in the land, but that it has been all
but ignored. Even the Civil Rights Commission, in its scathing
attack on the Florida electoral process,8' missed a most vital
point. It was not so much a tragedy that people were denied the
right to vote by being placed improperly on a felony list which
was then misused.8 2 The real tragedy was that it was permitted
to exist at all. One would think the restoration of civil rights,
most particularly the right to vote and the reintegration of ex-
79. See Otis H. King, The Law Student and his Relation to the Community, 1
TEx. SOUTH. INTRAMURAL L. REV. 167, 172 (1971).
80. See, e.g., Dominick Berbeo, Suit Filed Over Redistricting: Civil Rights
Groups Say Planned Map Disenfranchises Latino Voters, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 2,
2001, at N4.
81. See CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING
THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001).
82. See, e.g., Greg Palast, The Great Florida Ex-Con Game, HARPERS MAGA-
ZINE, March 1, 2002, available at www.gregpalast.com (containing specific exam-
ples of misuse).
284 [Vol. 22:269
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol22/iss2/1
MAD AS HELL
felons into the political process, would be sought as a means of
establishing a sense of belonging and connectedness to the com-
munity. On the other hand, the rigid denial of the franchise
continues the sense of difference and alienation. Ah, but there
is the rub. That is precisely what is being sought and achieved.
In Richardson v. Ramirez,83 the Supreme Court held that a
California statute disenfranchising convicted felons even after
they had served their sentences was constitutional.r 4 There
was a strong dissent by Justices Douglas, Marshall and Bren-
nan based on Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 5 The
case was clearly wrongly decided. Even if the California statute
met general due process requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment, its premise surely must fail when the disparate
impact of disenfranchisement felt by blacks and the poor is con-
sidered.s6 And, in the case of Florida, it is part of a pattern and
practice of disenfranchisement aimed directly at the heart of
the young black male population.87 Even if the process could
still withstand equal protection scrutiny, it is difficult to see
how, in a fair and honest court review, it could withstand the
force of the Fifteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act. It
is clear that Florida, through its many procedures, the center-
piece of which is felony disenfranchisement, has engaged in a
83. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
84. Id. at 56.
85. Id. at 85-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting) "The disenfranchisement of ex-
felons had 'its origin in the fogs and fictions of feudal jurisprudence and doubtless
has been brought forward into modem statutes without fully realizing either the
effect of its literal significance or the extent of its infringement upon the spirit of
our system of government.'" Id. (quoting Byers v. Sun Sav. Bank, 139 P. 948, 949
(1914)). This is an issue which now must be addressed, due to its racial overtones
and the potential for abuse created by the current definitions of felonies and the
use of misdemeanors to exclude individuals as if they were "felonies." (with a
largely racial impact).
86. For example, the disparate impact of disenfranchisement felt by African
Americans in Florida. See Conyers, supra note 5, at A27.
87. Juan Gonzalez, Never Again: The Real Election Scandal was the Disen-
franchisement of Black Voters, IN THESE TIMES, Jan. 8, 2001, at 14.
While 540,000 blacks voted in the 1996 presidential election, this year
893,00[0] showed up at the polls, a 65% increase. That number would have
been even greater were it not for the hundreds and perhaps thousands of
blacks denied the right to vote because . . . they had been mistakenly
purged as convicted felons. And of course, it does not include the 400,000
black men who, because of a single felony conviction, are banned for life
from voting in the Sunshine State. Id.
2852002]
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pattern and practice of impermissible discrimination regarding
access to the ballot. In this regard, the Civil Rights Commission
made the following recommendation:
5.2 The U.S. Department of Justice and the Civil Rights Divi-
sion in the Office of the Florida Attorney General should ini-
tiate the litigation process against state election officials
whose actions or failure to act violated relevant federal and/
or state laws by permanently disenfranchising voters on the
basis of felony conviction. Appropriate enforcement action
should be initiated to ensure full compliance with the elec-
tion laws.88
The sacred holy trinity of constitutional amendments for
blacks, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amend-
ments, attempted to insure that all citizens of this country, re-
gardless of their previous condition, would be treated equally, 9
enjoy the fundamental rights of citizenship and, most impor-
tant, would possess the right to vote. The Civil Rights Legisla-
tion was added to effectuate the intent of these Amendments. 90
The points of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments and all the Civil Rights Legislation were to eradi-
cate the horrors of past American racism, manifested through
slavery. 91 For a brief shining moment, Reconstruction held out
the promise of an effective implementation of the Amendments,
and the country glimpsed what a fully enfranchised freedman
could do when allowed to go to the polls unfettered. Unfortu-
nately, another close national election involving the State of
Florida occurred. 92 As a result of the now infamous Hayes-
Tilden Compromise, blacks in the South were cast adrift as the
protective umbrella of Reconstruction was removed.93 It did not
88. CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING
THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001).
89. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344 (1879).
90. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)); Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)).
91. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1872) (stating
that the Thirteenth Amendment was aimed at "negro slavery").
92. See generally ARI HOOGENBOOM, THE PRESIDENCY OF RUTHERFORD B.
HAYES 25-50 (1988) (discussing the disputed election of 1876).
93. This compromise caused withdrawal of federal troops from the South;
thereby it "devastated civil rights for African Americans." Yamamoto, supra note
56, at 536.
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take Southern white leaders long to re-impose a condition of
near servitude upon most free blacks and it was not happen-
stance that the first right removed was that of the franchise.
Gradually, through much effort and many court battles,
and notwithstanding monumental setbacks such as Plessy v.
Ferguson94 and its infamous declaration that separate could be
equal, the NAACP and other civil rights organizations, inch by
tortuous inch, regained some of the lost ground.9 5 Finally, in
1954, the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation96 gave hope that it stood as a bastion for the full estab-
lishment of the rights announced so grandly in the Constitution
with the passage of the three post Civil War Amendments, 97 but
never vigorously or fully implemented in practice save perhaps
for a brief period during the height of Reconstruction. The one-
man, one-vote pronouncement of Baker v. Carr,98 prefigured by
Wesley v. Sanders,99 was a culmination, or so it was thought, of
the struggle for the franchise and triumphantly memorialized
the sacrifices made by those who bled and died in the trenches
fighting for a meaningful implementation of the Fifteenth
Amendment. Reapportionment, which had previously been the
tool of gerrymanderers bent on perpetuating the existing sys-
tems of power, was now to be reviewed on the basis of rational
legislative intent.100
Battles for the vote were so fiercely contested because those
who would keep the necks of blacks bowed realized that if they
were permitted to vote they could no longer be prevented from
accessing the bounty of this country. More than any other
right, except perhaps that of freedom of speech, the right to vote
stands as the cornerstone of our democratic society. 01 Thus, to
deny improperly that right to a significant segment of the popu-
94. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
95. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Symposium, Movements and Law Reform:
Channeling Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
419 (2001).
96. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
97. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
98. 369 U.S. 186 (1961).
99. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
100. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 258 (Clark, J., concurring).
101. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18 ("Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory
if the right to vote is undermined.").
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lation seriously undermines the foundation upon which our re-
public rests.
While much of the process of disenfranchisement was ini-
tially instituted as a means of keeping blacks from voting, it has
now been refined and carried to its height in Florida as a
method of keeping those persons from the polls who are consid-
ered undesirable voters by those in power. 102 In the case of
Florida, it is a deliberate design by the Republicans to prevent
blacks and others who would most likely vote Democratic from
being able to vote at all.10 3 Thus, the grand scheme has been
not to outspend, or outcampaign the Democratic opposition in
Florida, but to construct a mechanism that effectively dimin-
ishes their pool of likely voters. This has been done so assidu-
ously and so insidiously that it has worked with few even
knowing it was being done, outside the circle of those who
orchestrated it. During the past presidential election, it worked
to turn a strong Democratic victory for Al Gore in the State of
Florida, and concomitantly the United States, into a Supreme
Court mandated Electoral College win for George W. Bush.104
The issue in Florida therefore transcends the question of
who actually won, although it is clear if one considers the will of
the voters that Al Gore won an overwhelming victory. The first
call by the networks that Gore had carried Florida 05 was cor-
rect. The exit interviews reported how people had voted. 0 6
102. See Gonzalez, supra note 87, at 14 (pointing out the difficulties posed by
the Florida ballots to under-educated blacks and Hispanics).
103. The authors posit that while the Florida processes for voting and disen-
franchisement may appear to be neutral on their face, they have been carefully
chosen and deliberately designed to have, in application, a devastatingly dispro-
portionate impact on minorities and others likely to vote democratic,
104. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
105. Edward Walsh & Howard Kurtz, Battleground State: Florida; Glitch in
Tally Throws Contest Into Turmoil, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2000, at A31.
106. The Jews who voted for Gore, to find these votes were counted for
Buchanan, must have felt they were being fed raw pork. The networks got it right,
after all, based on the methodology of their surveys, which asked people how they
had voted. The idea that people should have figured out how to use the confusing
butterfly ballots are akin to the use of literacy tests as a prerequisite to voting. See
Katzenback v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding a Congressional prohibition
of New York's use of a literacy test because it disenfranchised thousands of Puerto
Rican immigrants who had been educated in Spanish). Furthermore, even notices
to welfare clients must be made intelligible to those at whom which the message is
directed. See David v. Heckler, 591 F. Supp. 1033, 1042-44 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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Quite clearly, a substantial majority thought they had voted for
Gore and answered accordingly when interviewed. 10 7 The issue
of who won, however, becomes secondary to the more funda-
mentally important matters of the planned and executed sys-
tematic disenfranchisement of Black and poor voters,
Democrats, in that state. 08 Issues surrounding the propriety of
and mechanism for a recount, and the Supreme Court's das-
tardly role in stopping it, pale into insignificance when viewed
in light of the much more profound and lasting injury capable of
being administered by the mechanisms that were put into place
by the State to deny the franchise to blacks and/or the poor, the
Democrats. And, those who believe that a state mandated up-
grading of voting machines so that "errors" are no greater in
poor than rich precincts and the outlawing of the butterfly bal-
lots will come close to undoing that disenfranchisement are
sorely mistaken. Even with the improvements that such new
machines may bring and even though they will solve some of
the problems so glaringly exposed during the presidential elec-
tion, they will do nothing to return to the rolls those who have
already been purged for life, because they were black and poor
and likely to vote against the rising tide of Republican candi-
dates in that State. They will do nothing to prevent other
blacks and poor people, for the same reasons, from being re-
moved from the voting rolls, now and in the future in Florida
and other states.
It is quite a shock to look at the most fundamental tenet of
an ideal democracy, the right to vote, and realize that the
United States Constitution does not specifically guarantee it.109
Nowhere in that noble and magnificent document is there a
guaranteed right to vote for the election of one's representatives
at every level. 1 0 Most devastating of all, no right exists to have
a direct vote for the individual who is chosen to be President."'
What there is, and what most people have now come to con-
sider, the right to vote is the right to not be discriminated
107. See Walsh & Kurtz, supra note 105, at A31.
108. See supra, notes 73, 74, 85-87 and accompanying text.
109. See U.S. CONST.
110. See id. The federal right to vote, although not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution, can be seen as implicit in and inferable from the guarantee of Repub-
lican Government.
111. See id.
20021 289
21
PACE LAW REVIEW
against in the exercise of the vote once the franchise has been
extended. 112
The overreaching of the Supreme Court and the resultant
violation of Article III rises to a new level of impropriety
through the use of what could be arguably characterized as ra-
cist tactics, to steal the election and to deprive the voters of ac-
cess, meaningful ballots, and necessary recount. The Court and
commentators argue that there exists no constitutionally guar-
anteed right to vote, or to participate in the electoral process. 1
3
Yet, consider by way of illustration, the case of a popular vote
victory by a black candidate who nonetheless fails to gain elec-
tion because a predominantly racist electoral college votes
against him." 4 The obvious conclusion to be reached is that,
even absent express constitutional guarantees of the right to
vote, longstanding practice has enshrined this as a basic right
of all United States citizens above the age of majority.
The case of Marsh v. Chambers"5 stands for the proposition
that historical practice can sometimes lend support to constitu-
tional arguments."16 The Supreme Court held in this case that
the long-established practice of beginning sessions of the Ne-
braska state legislature with a prayer delivered by a state-
funded chaplain did not violate the Constitution's Establish-
ment Clause."17 However, common law and historical practice
112. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
113. See, e.g., Eduardo Guzman, Igarta De La Rosa v. United States: The
Right of the United States Citizens of Puerto Rico to Vote For the President and the
Need to Reevaluate America's Territorial Policy, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 141, 172
(2001) ("There is no constitutional right to vote for President.").
114. This analogous but extreme question has never been squarely faced, but
it should be clear that Congress should not permit avowed racists to vote against
the stated will of the voters or have that vote counted. A successful suit could be
launched against their participation or counting their vote through Congressional
rules or the Marbury decision. Further, the President could prevent their entrance
into the voting area. In short, all three branches would be able to enforce the Con-
stitution as amended.
115. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
116. See id. at 786-95.
117. Id. The Marsh v. Chambers decision has been criticized as confusing
"custom" and "history." See Jonathan A. Weiss, History and Custom in Interpreting
Church and State Questions, in SCRITi IN MEMORIA DI PIETRO GISMONDI 515 (Dott
A. Giuffre ed., 1991). Not to acknowledge that this historical practice had the force
of conferring rights to participate in the Federal election is simply absurd. In the
years after the adoption of the Constitution, with its flaws of disenfranchisement
of women, and of slavery for a people counted as less than fully human, see U.S.
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cannot always provide viable support for difficult constitutional
arguments. 118 It is absurd not to recognize that precedent in
case law, legislation, constitutional amendments and historical
practice all combine to sanctify the right of citizens to vote. Par-
ticularly for a Supreme Court so intent upon imposing a regime
of New Federalism and states' rights, a regime that the authors
contend is rife with racial overtones, the delegation of electoral
procedure to the State of Florida, subject to the outcome of duly
and properly conducted elections, should have been seen as an
area of which to steer clear.
The assertion that there is no federal right to vote is based
on the argument that the state governments would satisfy the
federal concerns. 119 Under any relevant reading of these provi-
sions, the Supreme Court had no authority to interfere with the
Florida court's attempts to insure that proper state procedure
should be followed. Moreover, 3 U.S.C. § 2 (extended by the
Seventeenth Amendment to senators) and 3 U.S.C. § 5 make ex-
plicit "who" can and cannot vote (not reaching the issue of
revotes, recounts, and the relevant timing),120 thereby making it
clear that the ability to vote in federal elections is co-extensive
with the ability to vote in state elections.
But, there is an a fortiori argument. Even while the Court
was upholding the exclusion of women from voting,' 21 Congress
passed the reconstruction package of the Thirteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments and the Civil Rights Acts. 22 These
Amendments included the general right to "Equal Protection"
set out in the Fourteenth Amendment, 123 and the specific right
CONST. Art. 1, § 2, cl. 3, there were a number of decisions, which seemed to indicate
that there was no "right" to vote. See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874)
(upholding the denial of the right to vote to women, relying on the country's history
of disenfranchisement as a basis for constitutional construction).
118. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965).
119. The right to vote is never explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. See
U.S. CONST.; see also supra note 110.
120. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. Under the Amendment there is a provision for
proceeding without an elected President in power. The time between the election,
voting of electors, inauguration render the "deadline" argument an obvious falla-
cious make weight - with particular irony juxtaposed to "all deliberate speed"
121. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
122. See The Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)); Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)).
123. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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to be free from racial discrimination stated in the Fifteenth
Amendment. 124 This meant that once the states created the
"right" to vote they could not then violate equal protection in
extending that right to its citizenry. In Black's and Murphy's
persuasive dissents in Adamson, with acute analysis and appro-
priate history, it can be seen that these Amendments were de-
signed to bring rights to all citizens as part of their federal
prerogatives. 125 These Amendments and the Civil Rights Acts,
which were designed to rectify the barbaric practice of slavery,
disenfranchisement, and humiliation, justify a refusal to accept
the vote as originally tabulated in Florida under the last elec-
tion for president. When there is a blatant disregard of the con-
stitutional guarantees of the right to vote and the use of racism
to destroy the ballot box's integrity, the monstrosity of the Bush
v. Gore decision becomes even clearer.
In part, the problems faced lie in the vagueness and lack of
specificity of the Constitution regarding the right to vote. Even
that second holiest amendment to blacks, the Fifteenth, does
not require blacks be permitted to vote. 26 Rather, what it does,
is prohibit the states from denying the right to vote "on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."127 Once the
states have chosen to conduct elections by popular vote, they
are bound both by the enjoinder of the Fifteenth Amendment
not to discriminate on a racial basis, as well as the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection mandate. Thus, no state may
extend or withhold the franchise to any group of individuals on
any basis that does not comport with the requisites of equal pro-
tection. 28 Moreover, and more importantly, no state may pro-
vide a process within that state that gives more weight to the
votes of one group of voters than it does to another. 29 The dif-
ferent methods of voting and counting ballots in Florida most
certainly violated that requirement. The Fifteenth Amendment
was also violated, although, perhaps, more covertly in the man-
ner in which the State's disenfranchising mechanisms fell more
124. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
125. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 68-125.
126. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
127. Id.
128. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
129. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1965), as cited in Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S.
74, 90 (1997).
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heavily on blacks. 130 The Supreme Court majority attempted to
dodge the equal protection bullet by the unprecedented an-
nouncement that Bush v. Gore would have application to that
case only.131 One can reasonably predict how the majority
would deal with the second bullet that could be fired at them
out of the barrel of the Fifteenth Amendment, although it would
be interesting to see them have to lift their robes and dance
around it.
A recent report suggests that, during the November 2000
election, blacks were ten times as likely to have their ballots
rejected due to disenfranchisement than whites. 32 On its face,
this is a clear denial of equal protection. It is also clear that
there was a disproportionate effect in this process visited on
black communities within Florida. When this is considered, in
light of Florida's civil death penalty statute which disen-
franchised 200,000 black males, 33 there can be no doubt as to
the overall impact of all of this on the outcome of the election.
Just as important, and apart from the issue of the treatment of
those who have engaged in criminal activity, is the matter that
a significant number of blacks were erroneously excluded from
voting as "ex-felons." 34 This included persons who were "mis-
identified," or, at worst, had committed misdemeanor offenses.
The pathetic picture of Justice Thomas attempting to explain to
a group of high school students that the most naked and brutal
exercise of partisan political power ever demonstrated by the
Supreme Court since its establishment was, somehow, some-
thing other than that in no way diminishes that truth. 35 It
would have been better for him and the other members of "the
felonious five" to have simply acknowledged that, having the
130. See Lantigua, supra note 74, at 14.
131. 531 U.S. 98, 103, 110 (2000).
132. CIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING
THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001) (the commission found that the disen-
franchisement of Florida voters fell most harshly on African Americans, claiming
they were ten times more likely than white voters to have their ballots rejected in
the November 2000 election).
133. Some writers put the figure as high as 400,000. See Gonzalez, supra note
87, at 14.
134. See Palast, supra note 82.
135. See Robert E. Thompson, Politics v. Justice, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake
City, UT.), Dec. 24, 2000, at AA01.
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power of a majority, they decided to give the election to George
W. Bush.
While not guaranteed as a fundamental right of citizenship
in the Constitution as initially written, the right to vote, never-
theless, is now the foundation upon which our participatory de-
mocracy is built. The right to vote is so intertwined in the
political system and is now so bound to the will of the electorate,
it is simply a sterile academic exercise even to consider the pos-
sibility of any radical change in the "universal" process we now
have. Most important, while it may be argued that the Fif-
teenth Amendment did not "give" blacks the right to vote in any
election, it certainly did provide that right "shall not be denied
... by any State on account of race .... ,,136 Given the pattern
and practice of the State of Florida, that is precisely what has
been done: blacks were denied the right to vote because of their
race. 13 7 And, it has been done in a most insidious fashion not
only to blacks, who are undoubtedly the most affected, but also
to poor people, regardless of race or ethnicity. 138 Statutes,
which appear neutral on their face, when applied, have had a
devastating impact on the ability of Blacks and poor people to
cast a vote in the State.139 When all that has been done by the
State of Florida is considered, it is quite easy to project that as
many as a half million people were denied the opportunity to
vote because of their race in direct violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment, or simply because they were prone to vote for the
Democrats. 140
136. U.S. CONST. amend. XV; see also supra note 110.
137. See Lantigua, supra note 74, at 14 (stating that some 200,000 Floridians
were either not permitted to vote on questionable or possibly illegal grounds, or
saw their ballots discarded and not counted, and a large and disproportionate
number were black).
138. Sally Kestin Buddy & John Maines, The Disenfranchised; Poor, Unedu-
cated Rejected Most In 2000 Election, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fl.), Nov.
18, 2001, at 1F.
139. For further explanation of this argument, see Elkan Abramowitz, Felon
Disenfranchisement v. Uniform Standards In Federal Elections, N.Y. LAw JOUR-
NAL, Jan. 2, 2001, at 3.
140. The U.S. Civil Rights Commission Report found that 31% of African-
American men in Florida were unable to vote. See Commission Report, supra, note
81. Nationwide, 1.4 million African-American men have lost the right due to dis-
enfranchisement. Virginia de Leon, Felons Want Right To Vote; Gonzaga Law Stu-
dent Helping To Craft Argument Against Law That Bars Felons From Casting
Ballots, THE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Spokane, Wa.), Nov. 4, 2000, at B1. In 2000, this
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Because the electorate is often so closely divided nationally,
the votes of blacks, particularly given the penchant to vote as a
Democratic bloc, is often the decisive factor in the outcome of
elections at all levels of government. 4 1 In the last national elec-
tions, 90% of black voters supported the Democratic Party,142
thus constituting nearly 20% of all votes cast for Al Gore. In
George W's own home State of Texas, where presumably he is
best known, and where it was certain he was going to win, the
Democratic vote among blacks reached 91%.143
The civil rights battles fought in the South, from the end of
Reconstruction forward, have been more about the right to vote
than any other issue. A disenfranchised people, even where a
majority, as was and is the case in many Southern counties, are
a helpless people. They lack the ability to impact the mecha-
nisms of government that control their lives. A right of control,
which by their numbers and the majoritarian rule of elections,
should have been theirs as a birthright has been denied by
strictly controlling access to the ballot. Even where not a ma-
jority, the black vote was significant enough to dictate the out-
come in close elections and could, thereby, decide which white
politician would be elected.'"
Nothing can compensate for the brutal injustices suffered
by Black Americans (and by other minorities such as Native
Americans). The only balm that salves the wounds a bit is the
belief in the elective process and the knowledge that a bloc vote
has an impact that can, and often does, determine the outcome
in local as well as national elections. 145 Now, to be told through
meant 57,7000 "ex-felons" were prohibited from voting in Florida. Palast, supra
note 82.
141. See, e.g., Earl 0. Hutchison, Mayoral Candidates Can't Ignore Black
Vote, DAILY NEWS OF L.A., Apr. 19, 2001, at N15.
142. Gore won 90% of the black vote. Lee Hubbard, The GOP Couldn't Win the
Black Vote - And That Made the Difference, THE S.F. CHRON., Nov. 15, 2000, at
A23.
143. See Exit Polls for Texas, at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/re-
sultsTX/frameset.exclude.html (last visited April 15, 2002).
144. Black voters seem to sense which non-Black candidate in an election
where there is no Black running, represents their best interest. Thus, you will
seldom see the Black votes evenly split for two White candidates. Once the internal
barometers of Black voters detect which is the best choice among the White candi-
dates, a kind of silent signal goes out quickly to that electorate and that is how the
overwhelming majority will vote.
145. See, e.g., Hutchison, supra note 140, at N15.
2002] 295
27
PACE LAW REVIEW
words and deeds that the Black vote can be rendered a nullity
by the machinations of Florida officials is a hurt too painful for
Blacks to bear.
John Lantigua's excellent article, How the GOP Gamed the
System in Florida, recalls how Republicans set out, years in ad-
vance of November 2000, to systematically disenfranchise more
than 200,000 persons likely to vote Democratic. 146 Other than
disclosing what was done and railing against the unmitigated
gall of its perpetrators, little can now be done to rectify the past
election. Lantigua quotes civil rights veteran Elmore Bryant of
Marianna, Florida as saying in reference to the effectiveness of
the Republican purge of voters, "They done got us." 147 And, so
they did. That is a tragedy. But, it would be an even worse
tragedy if nothing were done to prevent Blacks from being got-
ten again. And, they will do it if action is not taken to prevent
the continuation and expansion of the purges.
VII. What Should Have Been Done?
We do not care to dwell on what could have been had the
Supreme Court not been under the control of right wing con-
servatives determined to dictate a victory for George W. Bush.
Rather, let us look at an entirely different course of action that
should have been considered and which was under the control of
President Bill Clinton. Quite simply, President Clinton should
have sent Federal troops to Florida to protect the recount pro-
cess, particularly in Miami-Dade County once it became appar-
ent that an imported mob was determined to stop it.148
Precedent for such action, particularly as a means for protecting
those who are asserting rights guaranteed them constitution-
ally and statutorily certainly exists. Troops were sent to Little
Rock, Arkansas and to Oxford, Mississippi to ensure the entry
of black students into schools that had been ordered opened to
them by the federal courts. 149
146. See Lantigua, supra note 74, at 14-17.
147. Id. at 15.
148. For information about the protests in Miami-Dade, see Tim Padgett, Mob
Scene in Miami, TIME, Dec. 4, 2000, at 36.
149. See http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/section/integrat_1954tol963.asp
(last visited Apr. 15, 2002).
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There are no less than three types of quasi-practical argu-
ments advanced against the invocation of troops to prevent
black disenfranchisement and preservation of the sanctity of
the ballot:
A. Timing - when could it have been done?;
B. Unseemly - how would it look, what else might happen?; and
C. The Rule of Law.
The three appear to rest on the factual basis that all that
happened should have been seen coming and something done
earlier. Neither Clinton, nor Gore, nor the Civil Rights Depart-
ment did anything before the election in Florida about the use
and misuse of "felony" convictions to exclude from voting as ra-
cially biased nor the use of "misdemeanor" convictions treated
as "felonies" with a disproportionate effect on the Black commu-
nity. Felonies were, of course, originally serious common law
crimes - they now cover a multitude of presumed sins - often
reflecting right wing or racist propaganda. 150 Thus, this doc-
trine of them and others ("animals" conflates quite effectively
The most notable instance was the defiance in 1957 of federal orders by
Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas, who called out the Arkansas National
Guard to prevent integration in Little Rock. President Eisenhower re-
sponded by sending federal troops to enforce the court order for integration
• In 1962-63 violence erupted in Mississippi, precipitating a serious crisis
in federal-state relations. Against the opposition of Governor R. Barnett,
James H. Meredith, a black who was supported by federal court orders, reg-
istered at the Univ. of Mississippi in 1962. A mob gathered and attacked the
force of several hundred federal marshals assigned to protect Meredith; two
persons were killed. The next day federal troops occupied Oxford and re-
stored order. Meredith became the first African American to attend a Mis-
sissippi public school with white students in accord with the 1954 court
decision.
Id.
150. Professor Joseph Goldstein properly argued that we have a law of crimes.
"You do the Crime, you do the time." See, generally, Jonathan A. Weiss, The Justi-
fication of Punishment, 25 REV. OF METAPHYsIcs 527 (1972). Unfortunately, that
has now been distorted so that sentencing becomes a civil matter where the "vic-
tim" gets to demand his "vengeance" as a factor rather the state's interest and
individual needs. Due to such thinking many of our prisons now violate the rele-
vant U.N. Treaty. See John M. Glionna, The State Inmate Paper Angers Facility
Media: Sex Predators' Journal Alleges Abuses At Atascadero State Hospital, L.A.
TIMES, March 11, 2002, at B6. The leeway given by treating others as "them" has
even led to the framing of policeman because of their association with "un-
desirables." See Craig Horowitz, A Cop's Tale, NEW YORK MAG., Jul 16, 2001, at 3.
Such thinking of "them and us" led to the now justly criticized War on Drugs (criti-
cized as unconstitutional in Jonathan A. Weiss & Steve Wizner, Pot Prayer Privacy
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with racism, to which this Court and this decision has given its
blessing).
No agency, group, or movement noted or protested the dis-
parity of what ballots were used there. No Court actions were
brought when people were kept from the polls in Black commu-
nities by "failures" and "early closings."'151 No protests were
lodged anywhere about a brother and his cronies being in
charge of how ballots were to be counted, collected, and em-
ployed (of course there was the oblique reference when brother
Jeb promised brother George he wouldn't break his promise and
not to worry when the exit polls gave the State to Gore as re-
ported by a Bush crony). The legal objections were made piece-
meal - a chad here, an exclusion there, a miscount over yonder.
All these problems were festering, foreseeable, and deplorable.
The conclusion from this limited sample of corruption is that,
therefore, the invocation of troops would have been too much
too late. But early failure, continued cowardice or paralysis,
does not preclude a remedy to preserve democracy if it were to
work and be constitutional. Such factual claims cannot be ac-
cepted as a successful constitutional argument to prevent the
application of an appropriate remedy. Let us examine each ar-
gument in order.
A. Timing
1. The most obvious use of troops should have occurred
when Representative DeLay imported protesters to intimidate
those recounting the ballots in Dade County. 152 Even political
ostriches could have seen the thugs coming. Police are regularly
deployed to protect abortion clinics. How hard would it have
been to create a zone around those recounting and make their
exit safe? (To a feeble right wing claim that troops could be
called out to surround any recount and that those who "stopped"
later said it was "voluntary," the proper answer is that troops
should create free zones whenever there are democratic
and Police, Or the Right to Cut Your Own Throat in Your Own Way, 54 IOWA L.
REV. 709 (1969).
151. Problems Detailed With Florida Election, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTI-
NEL, Mar. 10, 2001, at 9A.
152. See Louis Freedberg, As Congress Reconvenes, GOP Wants to Keep Grip
on Power, S.F. CHRONICLE, Dec. 9, 2000, at A7.
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processes threatened by thugs and later declarations do not
solve actions intended to prevent a proper count in a democ-
racy.) It is likely that the threat by Clinton to take such action
in Florida would have been sufficient to prod Governor Jeb
Bush into action.
2. Regardless of when it became obvious that there was
widespread destruction of the proper balloting and unequal
treatment of voters and ballots during the voting and recount-
ing, Florida could have been placed under a Federal type of
martial law to protect a fair recount. This country had no
trouble creating a thousand mile Japanese free territory on ly-
ing claims that placed those evacuated in concentration
camps. 15 3 This country now executes and imprisons well out of
international norms so that even though the rate of crime, 54
and particularly juvenile crime, 55 has dropped (but with the
same number of juveniles in jail, probably as a consequence of
the increase of inferior employment opportunities) prisons con-
tinue next to armaments as America's greatest growth indus-
try, again with disproportionate minorities behind bars, 156 in
chains, and in chain gangs. A statewide recount could then
have been taken, if necessary by outsiders operating under uni-
form conditions with their activities protected by troops and all
other necessary means.
3. Once it became evident that the vote as counted was not
accurate (and some claim what the vote really was may never
be known as an excuse against recounting) the whole State's
vote should have been invalidated. Either the Florida votes
should have been excluded by Congress, or so requested by the
President. (What should happen if Jeb Bush and Jean Harris
had simply said "the vote is wrong" - here are our electors -
would that be the end of the matter and no federal power avail-
153. Natsu Taylor Saito, Model Minority, Yellow Peril: Functions of "Forgive-
ness" In The Construction of Asian American Legal Identity, 4 ASIAN L.J. 71 (1997);
see also, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
154. John Caher, Crimes Rates Add To Parole Debate, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 9, 2001,
at 1.
155. Shirley Downing, Violent Crime By Juveniles Down, Arrests Of Girls
Rise, COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Mar. 21, 2002, at B1.
156. Mandatory drug sentencing, among other factors, may be to blame for
the numbers. See Randy Diamond, Some Non-Violent Drug Offenders Getting A
Break, THE RECORD, Sept. 7, 2001, at A03.
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able or a revote ordered?) At that time, troops could have been
deployed, just as they are used to protect the franchise in what
the United States mocks as "banana republics." Any of these
actions might have kept an election honest. Any could have
been done.
B. Unseemly
But how would it look in a country that holds itself out as a
peaceful democracy? To whom? (Perhaps those that make this
argument should have read foreign news accounts and the con-
tinuing revulsion that one sees in the foreign press about the
administration and what happened.) 157 The New York Times
and those even to the right who control the mass media should
have been as horrified as they were by "communists" in the Mc-
Carthy era,158 "the yellow peril" of Chinese immigration, 159 and
by the Spaniards and Mexicans when wars of conquest were
commenced. (It is no coincidence that the present administra-
tion talks of "manifest destiny" to justify "offensive" and "defen-
sive" weapons in outer space as it jettisons the nuclear treaties
that offered mankind some hope from massive annihilation.) 160
President Andrew Jackson once remarked about a decision
by Justice Marshall: "John Marshall has made his decision: now
let him enforce it!"161 How unseemly was that? Why not use
157. A government spokesman, Jonathan Moyo, suggested on British Broad-
casting Corporation radio, in 2000, that the United States could learn from
Zimbabwe how to run a presidential election. Moyo said his country could not
have acted in a similar fashion without the threat of sanctions. "World seeks les-
sons from U.S. vote," available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/en.. .orld/americas/new-
sid_1016000/1016830.stm (last visited March 21, 2002). Troops could have been
employed if a revote had been ordered to ensure equal access, proper ballots, and
counting.
158. See Frank Wilkinson, Symposium, Revisiting The "McCarthy Era" Look-
ing at Wilkinson v. United States In Light of Wilkinson v. Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 681 (2000).
159. See Saito, supra note 152.
160. For example, Republican Senator Bob Smith (N.H.) recently said "[s]pace
is our next manifest destiny." Albert L. Huebner, Nuclear Space Threat, HUMAN-
IST, Mar. 11, 2002, at 6.
161. The decision in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), struck
down a Georgia statute that attempted to destroy the Cherokee Indians' political
community and land possession. The decision was never enforced against Georgia.
Amy Sender, Australia's Example of Treatment Towards Native Title: Indigenous
People's Land Rights In Australia and the United States, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 521,
554 n.132 (1999) (quoting HORACE GREELEY, THE AMERICAN CONFLICT 106 (1846)).
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the troops to enforce democracy when the same Court made a
mockery of the democratic process? Is that less unseemly?
We rightfully condemn star chambers and the rigged courts of
dictators. This country has invaded nations when dictators and
the courts, as simply their agents, violated "human rights" that
affected "American interests," for example, in the Dominican
Republic162 and Grenada.163 Was that "unseemly?" Here we do
have a separation of power; here the President is the Com-
mander in Chief of the Armed Forces (and armies are proud of
following orders as they now defend My Lai and other American
army activities). What could be more seemly than the Presi-
dent, with his separate constitutional powers, acting to prevent
a coup d'etat (by the same "politicians" who threatened to tryto
invalidate an election if the electoral college went against the
popular vote until the popular vote went so clearly against their
own candidate)? It was his duty and therefore seemly.
Some minor legalistic points could be made in rebuttal,
such as: "John Marshall in Marbury v Madison164 said the Su-
preme Court was the final arbiter of constitutional interpreta-
tion." That decision, right or wrong, was based on the rationale
that Justices specialize in the analysis of language. Language
was not at stake here but a whole process of democracy denied.
The Court's role is to determine how laws are to be applied, not
how rights are to be preserved. The Constitution specifically
allows for the suspension of habeas corpus during war,16 5 recog-
nizing special circumstances and delegates the keeping of order
and the democratic process to the Commander in Chief (those
who oppose our position do not oppose the imposition of "mar-
tial law" to keep down minorities and protesters, who should in
fact be protected by a number of Amendments). To this point
could be added that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments were passed for equal protection and to rid this
country of the poisonous effects of slavery and discrimination.
Congress further passed the Voting Rights and the Civil Rights
162. The U.S. invaded in the 1970's to put down a left-wing coup. Mike Wil-
liams, U.S., Globalization Cast Dark Shadow, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 25, 2001,
at B6.
163. President Ronald Reagan ordered the invasion in 1983. Georgie Anne
Geyer, Images of War, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Dec. 17, 2001, at A08.
164. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
165. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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Acts. Constitutional interpretation arrogated to the Supreme
Court does not mean their nullification.
Was it a coup d'etat? Yes. One Justice stopped a recount
and then he and his fellow travellers used the necessity for a
speedy final resolution (a doctrine without constitutional ba-
sis).166 Indeed, with the recent Amendment 167 for an acting
President when the present one is incapacitated there exist con-
stitutional remedies for the executive branch's continuity and
continuation in the absence of an elected President. Perhaps
Papa Doc giving Baby Doc Haiti was not a coup d'etat but only
nepotism. Here, the Court showed only its belief in its un-
checked (i.e., contempt for the separation of powers, one man,
one vote, and Articles -III) authority rather than a rule of law.
A trial lawyer can no longer respect the Court after that act. No
rationale can be found to justify that decision and doctrines an-
nounced which expressly have no precedential effect nor will
have. 168 The Court interfered in the process, such as it was, de-
signed to correct some of the egregious miscarriage of the
franchise. This was not its duty. It was beyond unseemly and
scandalous. Rather, it was a coup d'etat in favor of a favored
family's regaining control of a separate branch of the
government.
However, the pusillanimous pundits contend that there
was no shedding of blood (forgetting that people have died for
these rights). Why is there any reason to believe that the right-
ful act of a President with the troops at his command would
cause bloodshed? Who would revolt? The chattering heads on
television? Those crazy right-wingers who blow up federal
buildings? The Republicans who bear arms? Not much evi-
dence exists for this fear - and what a fear for a country which
166. In a 1960 election, which was very close, Hawaii's electors were not
named until January 4 th. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court majority said the re-
count had to be completed by December 12 in the 2000 election. See Doug G. Sav-
age & Henry Weinstein, Supreme Court Ruling: Right or Wrong?, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
21, 2000, at A24.
167. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3.
168. In Marbury, Justice Marshall declared that the Supreme Court will be
the final interpreter of the Constitution. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying
text.
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reduced Cambodia back to the Stone Age, 169 bombs Iraq, 170 and
has cops shooting innocent people in the back. 17' Will there be
less of this bloodshed now? Where were the problems when
troops massacred innocents at the Pullman strike, 72 at the
Robeson concert in upstate New York, 73 and now when they
protest "globalization" 74 - when free speech is involved rather
than the ballot box reduced to a mockery? (An allied, non-legal
point: suppose the Supreme Court issued an injunction which
would not only be outside its power or jurisdiction, against a co-
equal branch, but really cause constitutional confusion in the
right-wing pundits. Such an injunction could be properly ig-
nored as President Jackson purportedly said about a Marshall
decision: "Where are the troops?" The Commander in Chief is
in charge of them and if we have really reached the point where
the fear of an unauthorized act by five mistaken dishonest Jus-
tices would cause a rebellion in the troops against his orders, we
face anarchy and did really experience a coup d'etat by five in-
tellectual frauds. But we doubt this.)
C. The Rule of Law
The law is not what a few fanatics appointed by Presidents
say it is in realms where they should not go. The rule of law
means that laws are followed. They were broken in Florida and
by the Supreme Court. In a country of "laws" and not men, un-
less by "men" we mean those who have made a mockery of de-
mocracy, there are limits to what any institution, no matter
what respect it is supposed to claim, may do. Although there
169. The Nixon Administration authorized the bombing of Cambodia in the
1970's. See Chuck Klosterman, Communists Took Over After Coup In 1975, AKRON
BEACON J., Jan. 7, 2002, at A4.
170. See, e.g., Robert Burns, U.S. and Britain Bomb Iraq, GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS, Aug. 10, 2001, at C8.
171. For example, the killing of Amadu Diallo in New York. See Tara George,
Diallo Kin Suing For $61m, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 19, 2000, at 16.
172. For a background of the strike, see William J. Adelman et al., The Pull-
man Strike: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 583 (2000).
173. See RING LARDNER, THE ECSTASY OF OWEN Mum 199-209 (Prometheus
Books, 1997).
174. See Michael M. Phillips & Yaroshav Trofimov, Trading Places: Police Go
Undercover To Thwart Protesters Against Globalization, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11,
2001, at Al.
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exist intellectually "respectable" arguments for Dred Scott,175
many maintain its ruling should not have been followed. 176 If
the Supreme Court ordered all black men to be put to death, all
Chinese to be deported, or declared a war on Afghanistan,
would that be considered the rule of law? No. The Supreme
Court would have broken the rule of law in those instances just
as it did here. The President is supposed to enforce the law. He
had the troops to do it. He had the legal authority and the
moral obligation to take action. He did not. It is his and the
country's shame, now glossed over by the lazy liberal legalisms,
a right-wing press, and a supine group of "elected" representa-
tives. The troops should have been called out.
Because they were not, we no longer have the "rule of law."
Treaties are broken, racists are running civil right depart-
ments, and environmental promises are ignored. The list goes
on. Elect thugs, let thugs destroy an election, let them run the
country, but then do not claim you have upheld the rule of law.
The rule of law required that this not happen. Now it has hap-
pened and it is not clear whether we can ever reverse the dam-
ages and revert to the rule of law, to the principles of
democracy, to the eradication of racism, unless we admit the
cowardice and failure of the President not to follow his duty
under the law to use troops in order to prevent the perpetuation
of a corrupted election which will stand out forever as America's
most recent shining example of shame.
VIII. What Should We Do Now?
It may be too late to reconsider what should have been done
as a guide to current actions. We cannot call back anything
that has happened and redo it. As to the past and what might
have been done differently, we can only lament. But, as to the
future, we can prepare and we can take action.
First, there should be a complete and thorough investiga-
tion by the Justice Department, based on the recommendations
175. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (denying citizens status
to African Americans). The Court endorsed the view that blacks were unfit to as-
sociate with whites in social and political relations. See id. at 407.
176. See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (Yale Univ. Press 1975).
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of the Civil Rights Commission.177 Second, there should be an
all out assault on the felony disenfranchisement process. Re-
gardless of how this Court may be expected to act, the effort
should be undertaken, just as it was when the cases were pur-
sued before hostile courts in the dark days of the civil rights
movement.178 Even Justice Thomas may be pried away from his
adopted twin, Antonin Scalia, when confronted with the over-
whelming evidence of a practice and pattern that has a devas-
tating and overwhelmingly disproportionate effect on black
males. More important, every civil rights organization must
join this fight.
Jesse and Al, Maxine and Mfume must yell loudly about
the injustice perpetrated on black males and other minorities by
this and other devices. They are right to do so. Who, though,
cares for "ex-felons"? In Florida, the disenfranchisement of
these persons has resulted in 31% of that State's black voting-
age males being struck from, or as is often the case, never being
placed on the voting roles. 179
One would like to think that one of the ways to integrate an
ex-felon back into society would be to provide some sense of re-
sponsibility and participation in the body politic. Yet, in those
states, such as Florida, where a disenfranchisement death pen-
alty is imposed, just the opposite is the case.
The United States Supreme Court has already held that
the disenfranchisement action is constitutional, 18 0 thus no fron-
tal attack on this practice is likely to succeed at this time. That
notwithstanding, this practice must be exposed for exactly what
it is - a powerful mechanism for disenfranchising black men. It
is the poll tax, the literacy test and the grandfather clauses all
over again and all rolled into one.
177. See CmL RIGHTS COMMISSION, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DUR-
ING THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001).
178. The civil rights movement looked to the courts as primary venues of ad-
vancing their goals. While many of the cases brought were not successful, the liti-
gation campaign led to the huge victory in Brown v. Board of Education, 348 U.S.
886 (1954). For a historical look at the use of litigation in advancing the Civil
Rights Movement, see Eskridge, supra note 95.
179. This number is derived from a 1998 study conducted by the Sentencing
Project & Human Rights Watch. In total, 57,700 ex-felons were prohibited from
voting. See de Leon, supra note 139, at B1.
180. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
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Further, there must be a rigorous scrutiny of the next pres-
idential election in Florida to determine the impact of the
changes the state promised to implement.' 8 ' If the fight for the
vote cannot be won through the legal process in the courts, and
it would be extremely premature to assume that it cannot,
given the ammunition that is now available for the assault on
the current methods of disenfranchisement, then it must be
won politically and in the streets if necessary.
The essential right to vote for a democracy required the
proper response by the executive - sending troops to prevent all
the intimidation, exclusion, miscounting, and so on. Such an
act was not only the President's duty but also a means of pre-
serving the democracy and the franchise. Compare instead
what the current Attorney General and the administration have
done in the name of "security" to destroy democratic and consti-
tutional rights of due process, free expression and privacy.
Such destruction has been flimsily justified by one terrorist act
which was probably predictable and preventable through intel-
ligence and communication. This is where the remedies should
lie, not in the current destruction of civil liberties and rights by
those who are in power simply because the President did not
use the troops to save the democratic electoral process. 8 2
181. Florida Governor Jeb Bush promised immediate action towards election
reform in December of 2000. See Mark Hollis, Governor Bush Vows To Modernize
Voting System, SouTH FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 15, 2000, at 1OA; David Wasson,
Jeb Bush Promises Election Reform, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Dec. 15, 2000, at 10. In 2001,
Florida's legislature adopted wide-ranging election reforms, which, among other
things, outlawed the punch-card ballot. Linda Kleindienst & Bob LaMendola, Vot-
ing Reform Funds In Doubt Next Year, SouTH FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 23, 2002,
at 8B.
182. The current airline searches have shown that only clumsy amateurs are
caught. Some random violence has appeared in every society as complex as ours
and cannot be prevented by any measures, but only inhibited and detected by so-
phisticated and particularized shared information and safeguards. The answer is
not in increasing the arbitrary power of those now in control. One of the authors
will be publishing a lengthy analysis of privacy, and the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments in a forthcoming issue of the Seton Hall Legislative Journal. Right now a
list of articles about infringement of civil liberties by the present administration
would be longer than this article-what has occurred because the troops were not
sent and the election was not proper has been far more destructive than any imagi-
nable consequence of sending the troops.
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